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Democratic deficit and communication hyper-inflation  
in health care systems  
 
Abstract 
There is a widespread perception of poor performance and reduced trust 
in relation to health case systems. The roots of this problem are 
interpreted in terms of the democratic deficit and communication hyper-
inflation. The democratic deficit is characterized as a persistent but 
chronically unsatisfied demand for complete public authority over all 
significant societal institutions – including the health care system. 
However, such professional institution systems necessarily perform their 
functions using specialized internal languages, which are not transparent 
to external scrutiny. Furthermore, professional institution systems tend to 
eliminate all subjective and imprecise criteria, such as individual moral 
values. This situation encourages communication inflation, which 
describes the large and unpredictable divergence between the real and 
nominal informational content of communications. Hyper-inflation is 
generated by the development of morality-free information management 
sub-systems (specifically public relations and advertising) to the extent 
that ‘official’ communications convey almost zero reliable information. 
Reduction of the democratic deficit and control of communication 
inflation depends upon successful penetration of the health care system 
by representative public values, including individual morality. 
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Introduction  
There is an international sense of crisis in relation to health care systems - 
countries differ, but all apparently share a perception of deep problems in 
providing comprehensive, effective and efficient health care. The crisis 
can be encapsulated as having two main aspects: the perception of poor 
performance in the systems and a reduced level of trust in the way that 
the services are provided, managed and measured. These can be seen as 
consequences of two phenomena which characterize ‘expert’ services in 
modern industrial society: inflation of communications and the 
democratic deficit.  
 
Professional Institution Systems 
Human society can be understood as a system of communications that - in 
total - perform the function of information processing (Pokol, 1992, 
Luhmann, 1995).  
The objective of this information processing is to increase the predictive 
stability of the society - the ability of the society to adapt to 
environmental change, such that it can maintain the course of its intended 
development. In particular, the intended development of modern societies 
is primarily to maintain economic growth. This is necessary for many 
reasons, for example sustained economic growth seems to be essential for 
the stability of modern societies (Gellner, 1988), a relatively slow rate of 
growth compared with competitors will render societies vulnerable to 
economic colonization (Wright, 1999), and also economic success is 
regarded as the best guarantee of electoral success (as in the 1992 Clinton 
campaign catch phrase ‘it’s the economy, stupid!’).   
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As Adam Smith famously described, economic growth depends mainly 
on productivity gains made possible by division of labour. The 
consequent specialization of function implies ever increasing amounts of 
specialized communications in order to coordinate the divided labour. 
Elaborate and interlocking division of labour requires greatly increased 
logistical organization and exchange of information in order to coordinate 
the many diverse activities. To coordinate a national health care system 
requires exceptionally high levels of  information exchange.  
This informational complexity leads to the formation of professional 
institution systems whose role is to coordinate specific aspects of human 
activity (Pokol, 1992, Luhmann 1995). In modern industrial societies 
there are many such systems - some of these are represented by the major 
divisions of government such as the legal system, the education system, 
and systems of economic and monetary management. The health care 
system represents one of the largest.  
 
Professional technical languages 
These professional institution systems are managed and implemented by 
‘elites’ of skilled professional experts (eg. doctors, lawyers, economists), 
who command large resources including personnel. These groups tend to 
develop distinctive fundamental values (termed ‘evaluation dogmas’; 
Pokol, 1992), such as due process in law, profitability in economics, or 
the treatment of illness in the case of medicine. Such evaluation dogmas 
structure and permeate the specialized communication system.  
Systems of specialized communications can therefore be understood as 
comprising a specific professional ‘language’ (Pokol, 1992). Their 
linguistic features include a distinctive vocabulary (‘lexicon’) and 
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distinctive rules of reasoning (‘syntax’). Such languages are sometimes 
termed a ‘technical jargon’. An example of this kind of professional 
language would be the abbreviated but very exact vocabulary and 
structure of referral letters that pass between a consultant specialist and a 
general medical practitioner. Another example would be the internal 
letters, instructions and memos that circulate within the Department of 
Health and the Health Authorities. Such languages are hardly 
understandable by outsiders, and in consequence the information 
processed using a such language is accessible only to those who have 
mastered the language and are a part of the related professional institution 
system.  
The function of professional languages is to handle complex 
communications. Complex information is filtered, summarized and 
rendered into a standard vocabulary, and dealt-with in a routinized form 
of processing that is adapted to that activity. Technical communications 
within the professional sub-system are therefore made clear, precise and 
unambiguous - especially as compared with non-technical 
communications that exist external to the system. And these qualities 
mean that specialist professional communications provide the stability 
necessary to enable prediction and planning.  
The information-processing role of institutions that act as professional 
systems, and the fact that they deal with highly complex activities, means 
that these organizations typically require specialized institutional 
processes and forms of internal organization.  For example, medicine is 
characteristic in being linked to formal mechanisms for recruitment, 
training, certification and evaluation, incentives and promotion processes.  
On top of this, professions usually emphasize a special type of morality 
which is enforced mainly by internal mechanisms. In medicine such 
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ethical functions are formally embodied by the General Medical Council, 
but actually permeate many aspects of education and practice (Downie & 
Calman, 1987). These ethical aspects of professionalism serve to assure 
external agents that power and privileges will not be abused. 
 
Inter-penetration of professional institution systems  
While professional institution systems are relatively autonomous, and 
develop around specific societal functions that are amenable to a common 
set of information processes, there is naturally some degree of inter-
penetration (Pokol, 1992).  
For example, medicine and law function independently for most of the 
time, but there are important ways in which the legal system penetrates 
the health care system. Medicine will always be practiced with some kind 
of implicit deference to the legal framework, and this deference may be 
more or less constraining. Where legal sanctions are severe and frequent, 
medical systems and practices may become explicitly designed around 
their compliance to the legal system. For instance, a doctor may practice 
‘defensive medicine’ - which could be defined as treating the patient with 
the primary goal of avoiding the possibility of litigation, and only 
secondarily pursuing the distinctive goals of the health care system.  
The spontaneous pursuit of self-interest by professional institution 
systems ensures that competitive attempts at inter-penetration are a 
recurring feature (Pokol, 1992). Such inter-penetration may improve, 
damage or leave unaffected the predictive accuracy of the specialized 
communication processes. On the one hand, the existence of ‘external 
scrutiny’ may act to diminish corruption or inefficiency in a system, on 
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the other hand the imposition of inappropriate categories and modes of 
information-processing may reduce effectiveness.  
The British health care system has recently been penetrated not just by 
law, but by politics, economics and accountancy. The effects can be 
observed by changes in the lexicon and syntax, which have taken-on 
terms derived from other areas of discourse - such as politically-generated 
managerial argot, economics-generated focus on pricing and efficiency, 
and accountancy-generated systems of audit and quality assurance. 
 
Communication inflation 
Monetary inflation involves a continual rise in prices, which translates as 
a decline in the real world value of money. Communication inflation 
involves a similar process, whereby the claims of professional institution 
systems are continually becoming greater than their real world value.  
But inflation has a more deeply damaging aspect than this preliminary 
definition suggests - essentially inflation is a decline in the informational 
content of prices; and the main problem is not continually rising prices, 
but the unpredictability of price rises (Mankiw, 1999). The outcome is 
that the price no longer communicates information about the value of a 
commodity.  
When monetary inflation is merely a modest and regular annual price rise 
of a few percent this presents no serious economic problem, because the 
percentage inflation can simply be included in planning. The economic 
problem occurs in hyper-inflation - such as occurred in Germany during 
the nineteen twenties. Price and wage rises were both large and 
unpredictable (technically, price and wage variance was large), such that 
nobody could plan more than a few hours or days ahead. The nominal 
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monetary value ceased to have an understandable relationship with the 
real world value of goods or services. In other words, price was no longer 
operating as a reliable signal for economic communication.  
The same principle applies to other forms of communication. When there 
is a modest and predictable exaggeration by professional institution 
system communications with the external world, then the communication 
still serves as an effective source of information because observers in the 
real world can simply subtract (or discount) a predictable amount. But 
when communication hyper-inflation sets in, then the nominal 
communication ceases to convey any real world information.  
In the 1990s, the National Health Service in the UK generated an internal 
language of ‘performance indicators’ for communication of targets and 
attainments within the health care system (Ham, 1992). These statistics 
have strict operational criteria - such that the way that such data are 
defined, recorded, collected, analyzed and communicated are explicit and 
closely controlled. So, within the specialized system of the NHS 
managerial hierarchy this information is relatively precise and 
unambiguous, and forms the basis for monitoring, prediction and 
planning - and this information also determines the salary and status of 
professional managers.  
However, public communications of the NHS managerial hierarchy have 
probably reached the level of hyper-inflation. Announcements from the 
Department of Health are usually honest, according to formal, internal 
professional criteria. But the ‘real world’ value of such announcements is 
unpredictable. The informational content may be hugely exaggerated - 
such as the regular reports of the continual and substantial improvement 
in NHS services. On the other hand, the informational content may be 
highly accurate using external real world criteria - such as recent 
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announcements that the MMR (measles, mumps, rubella) combined 
vaccine is safe (Fitzpatrick, 2002).  
The external observer cannot simply subtract a standard degree of 
exaggeration from official Health announcements, because information 
may be accurate, or there may be there may anything from moderate to 
massive degrees of exaggeration - especially when some officials try to 
compensate for expected discounting. For example, the misleadingly 
exaggerated and incomplete official information about the hazards of 
AIDS infection in the mid-1980s seems to have been an attempt to 
generate behavior change in the face of widespread public cynicism about 
the value of official information (Fitzpatrick, 2000) 
A tendency towards hyper-inflation is a defining characteristic of the 
externally-oriented communications of professional institution systems in 
which trust has so eroded that communications have ceased to function as 
information transfers. 
 
Elimination of personal morality 
While specialized professional languages usually work well for internal 
purposes, they require to be ‘translated’ for the purposes of external 
communication. ‘Inflation’ occurs because the nominal and real content 
of communications tend to become uncorrelated. This tendency can be 
understood in terms of the decreased role of individual morality in 
professional institution systems (Pokol, 1992).  
The functional optimization of professional institution systems entails 
eliminating imprecise and subjective considerations, and selecting the 
minimum number of technically-suitable criteria for the needs of 
information processing. Such eliminated criteria include individual moral 
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values (MacIntyre, 1999), which are notoriously imprecise and 
subjective. Within professional institution systems, moral values can only 
be made stable and predictable when operationalized in terms of 
surrogate data and processes that are amenable to quantification and 
standardization. The successful elimination of individual morality 
provides efficiency benefits, but may lead to highly inflated 
communications.  
Individual moral values provide a check on the relationship between the 
internal and ‘real-world’ value of communications (Havel, 1992). When 
specialist professionals morally evaluate their specialized activities, this 
provides a feedback loop which tends to prevent excessive divergence of 
internal and real-world languages. However, this evaluative role of 
personal morality inevitably leads to subjective and unpredictable 
decisions, reducing the stability of information-processing, and tending to 
reduce the purely technical performance of the professional system. So, 
despite the efficiency-damaging effect of individual morality, there seems 
to be an appropriate level of penetration of any specialized technical 
system by moral values. Without the check of individual morality, the 
phenomenon of ‘over-professionalisation’ of a sub-system will tend to 
develop, and the technical world and the external world will end-up 
speaking what are literally different languages.  
For instance, from 1992 mental health service targets were monitored 
simply by the suicide rate statistic - which was only one outcome measure 
of mental health among many, many possible others (Charlton, 1994). 
Although the measure has advantages of simplicity and precision, its real-
world relationship to the effectiveness of mental health care services is 
conjectural, and its value as a integrative surrogate measure of these 
services unproven. The consequence is that the suicide rate measure has a 
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very different status within the health care system and outside that 
system. So long as suicide rate performs well as an internally-used 
surrogate measure of mental health, then the NHS managerial hierarchy is 
satisfied. But when such information is communicated to the external 
world, technical definitions need to be translated into common language 
equivalents - so that decline in suicide rates might be ‘translated’ as a real 
world improvement in the effectiveness of mental health services.  
No deliberate dishonesty is involved here. Improvement as defined by 
specialist managerial information systems is entirely compatible with 
decline according to the external world criteria. If individual moral 
evaluation has been eliminated from a professional system, then 
disparities between the nominal values of technical information and their 
real world values are allowed whenever it is expedient, and to whatever 
extent is most expedient. Communication inflation may proceed 
unchecked leading to hyper-inflation. 
 
Democratic Deficit  
The democratic deficit is the gap between public demands to monitor and 
control the activities of professional sub-systems and the achieved level 
of monitoring and control.  
The deficit arises because one of the fundamental evaluation dogmas of 
modern western societies is that there ought to be democratic authority 
over all significant aspects of public life (Bealy et al., 1999). In the NHS, 
the deficit is seen as the gap between the ‘ideal’ of a democratically-
controlled health care system - and the actuality of a largely autonomous 
professional institution system, able to pursue its own agenda regardless 
of democratic wishes.  
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The democratic deficit is exacerbated by communication hyper-inflation, 
which obscures the gap between expectations and reality by exaggerated 
claims. Official communications routinely claim that the health care 
system closely conforms to the democratic ideal (or will shortly do so), 
but the public does not trust these official communications.   
The democratic deficit may also be obscured by the existence of 
regulatory professional sub-systems charged with the application of 
democratic control to primary sub-systems. In order to perform a 
democratically-regulatory role, such institutions would need to 
demonstrate both their democratic credentials and their effectiveness at 
imposing control. But it is very unusual for professional regulatory 
institutions to accomplish both of these objectives.  
Within the health care system there are vast numbers of official 
regulatory institutions that are empowered to force their will on health 
care providers (36 are listed by Willis (2001), but this list is incomplete). 
However, such institutions typically lack democratic credibility. As a 
recent example, since 1999 the National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) has been charged with overseeing the rational use of 
pharmaceuticals and other technologies in the NHS. However, NICE is 
constituted as an branch of the health service bureaucracy and is staffed 
by political appointees and technical specialists (Miles et al, 2000). 
Rather than an instrument of democratic will, NICE is itself a 
demonstration of the democratic deficit, and its public communications 
display all the hallmarks of communication inflation. When the anti-
influenza drug Relenza was recommended as inappropriate for NHS use, 
NICE quoted a measure of its effectiveness that was technically accurate 
(based on the ‘intention to treat’ statistic), but which was translated to 
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generate an underestimate of the drug’s clinical usefulness which 
(expediently) supported NICE’s decision (Charlton, 2001).  
In practice, although purportedly democratic, existing NHS regulatory 
institutions merely function as additional professional institute systems. 
Not only do they fail to reduce the democratic deficit and control 
communication inflation, but they actually multiply the scale of the 
problem. 
 
Alternative institutions 
The democratic deficit is characterized by a persistent but unsatisfied 
demand for public authority over professional institution systems. The 
failure of professional sub-systems is indicated by communication 
inflation which increases the democratic deficit until reformist tendencies 
are triggered. 
When the public are unsatisfied by official regulatory responses, this 
demand will usually generate alternative ‘unofficial’  professional 
communication systems that more closely represent grass-roots public 
opinion. For example, in the UK health care system this kind of role is 
performed by charitable associations representing sufferers from various 
diseases, by the Consumers Association, and by lobby groups for special 
interest groups (eg. womens’ health, the elderly, the homeless etc.). Such 
institutions generate public communications that are often perceived to be 
more honest than official sources. Such ‘grass roots’ credibility may 
combine with organizational influence on pressure on the political system 
(by mobilizing electoral support, lobbying, influencing parties through 
donations to political funds etc.) and support efforts at penetration of the 
health care system via the administrative and legal sub-systems in the 
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form of new and more binding regulations. Similarly, the media may also 
represent themselves as champions of popular opinion; and investigative 
journalism may be directed at uncovering and remedying abuses in the 
health care system, and exposing discrepancies between official claims 
and real world performance.  
However, when professional institution systems are failing and such 
reforms are ineffective, then people may try to insulate themselves from 
system failure by seeking alternative providers. Such demand may 
generate institutions that plausibly solve problems of perceived 
inadequate effectiveness or non-moral behavior. Inadequate state health 
care systems create a demand for ‘private’ providers who - since they 
must compete for clients - may more easily be penetrated by common 
moral values. Such market-dominated institutions may demonstrate near-
zero levels of communication inflation, at least towards their target public 
(Pokol, 1992).  
 
Inevitability of the Democratic Deficit  
Although communication inflation may be kept under control, and the 
democratic deficit minimized, there is a sense in which these phenomena 
are inevitable in modern societies.  
Highly specialized professional institution systems are difficult to control 
externally - whether such control be democratic, or of any other kind. 
This difficulty arises because of the necessarily highly specialized 
language of their internal communications. Those who lack an 
understanding of the specialized language are unable to monitor or 
control such institutions without significantly damaging their functions. 
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And such a level of understanding may be all but impossible to an 
outsider.  
Highly professionalized institution systems also develop their own 
morality-free bureaucracies that are very prone to produce highly inflated 
communication for the outside world. A clear example is provided by the 
ever-increasing role and scope of public relations and advertising within 
the NHS. The health care sub-system in charge of external 
communications, functions explicitly to generate expediently biased 
information. Such communications may be able to thwart external 
attempts to oversee, monitor and control. Of course, hyper-inflation is 
eventually recognized, and generates public demands for greater 
democratic control; but increasing public dissatisfaction may be assuaged 
(or confused) by yet further investment in communications management, 
allowing further inflation.  
In sum, the democratic ideal is for authority over professional institution 
systems. The political reality is one of a social system run by near-
autonomous professional institutions. Yet the nature of this situation is 
obscured by endemic communication hyper-inflation, exacerbated by 
morality-free information management. Information is abundant, but so 
unreliable that the magnitude of the problem cannot accurately be 
evaluated. The outcome is a substantial democratic deficit. 
In principle, more democratic and effective regulation of professional 
institutions could reduce the democratic deficit, and an increased role for 
individual morality could impose controls on communication inflation. 
But at present, it seems that the problems of a comprehensive national 
health care system cannot ultimately be solved. If attempted reforms 
continue to fall short, ultimately smaller scale and less comprehensive 
alternative systems will arise.  
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